Analysis Reports

SAS relaunched its intra-Europe business class cabin on 1-Oct-2025. This fits in with its closer ties to Air France-KLM and its growing role in feeding its partners' long haul hubs.

However, business class capacity on European short/medium haul routes is at historically low levels: intra-Western Europe business class seat numbers are down by 81% over the past 10 years.

Nevertheless, the decline has levelled off, and may even be rising very slowly.

This report examines the development of intra-Western Europe business class capacity over the past decade, and ranks European airlines in this segment.

Following on from an earlier CAPA - Centre for Aviation report on the evolution of Electric Vertical Take-Off and Landing aircraft (eVTOLs), this report looks at the supporting 'airport' infrastructure for this new and rapidly part of the air transport business - the vertiport.

A vertiport need not be at an airport; it can be on top of a skyscraper in downtown Manhattan, or on the roof of a commercial building on a trading estate in any industrial city - replicating an earlier trend towards helicopter operations in some places, while creating entirely new markets in others.

It is no coincidence that the premier manufacturing hub for eVTOLs and for vertiport infrastructure is the Chinese city of Shenzhen, regarded as 'China's Silicon Valley'.

Notable operational facilities are already in use across the world, and major airport operators like Groupe ADP, Fraport and Corporación América Airports are either co-operating with Urban Air Mobility manufacturers or going it alone to ensure that scheduled commercial airports do not miss out on the opportunity to play their part in this potential new revenue stream.

The investment figures that are common to the conversation on vertiports have risen dramatically, from millions of dollars to billions, with 1,500 of them at the planning stage globally.

However, there is often a disconnect between planning and reality.

As with eVTOLs, not all the investors are yet convinced, and they won't be until there are regular flights in operation that are clearly making money.

And there are a few technical issues to deal with that question the viability of operations in some circumstances.

While the talk in the airport industry concerning M&A deals is usually about companies like VINCI, Fraport, Groupe ADP, Corporación América and GIP/Blackstone, a French company quietly beavers away in the background operating - one way or another - 21 airports that are literally strung out across the globe, to the extent that you could do a 'round the world vacation' by flying between them.

Egis, and its subsidiary Segap, typically eschew big name airports in favour of those that might be off the beaten track, but which have long term potential within their region. The quid pro quo is a commitment by Egis towards sustainability at every stage of a concession contract.

By this measure it has got itself involved with four airports in France, two in Belgium and others in Africa, Latin America and French Polynesia, along with a host of consultancy contracts in the Middle East.

Now, within a consortium involving other French companies, it has taken over the Cayenne-Félix Eboué Airport in French Guiana from the government there, committing to USD85 million in investments over 30 years.

There will always be a revenue stream from the French space rocket station there, but otherwise there is a very thin population of only 300,000, and annual tourism amounts to around 10,000.

Compare that to the 2.3 million that visited Iceland, a country with a similar population count, in 2024.

Clearly, much work needs to be done in that respect, but Egis is always up for the challenge. And the locals can be assured that whatever is done will be sustainable.

More than three and a half years after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, its aviation market remains depressed.

Sanctions imposed by Western countries in response to its attack on Ukraine are weighing on the Russian market.

The international market is particularly affected - its international seat capacity is scheduled to be 35.1% below 2019 levels in 2025, and domestic capacity is projected to be down by 15.4% compared with 2019.

However, drone attacks on Russia and restrictions on airspace have adversely affected flights across the country. Domestic seat numbers are set to fall by 6.5% year-on-year.

Russia's total seat capacity in 2025 is scheduled to be down by 2.8% year-on-year, and 25.1% below its 2019 peak.

The failures inherent in the attempt to privatise the United States' airport system have been well documented since the procedure began almost 30 years ago, and in a piecemeal way right from the start, with only a maximum of five airports to be privatised in the original manifestation.

That was expanded to any airport with no cap under the first Trump Administration, but the fact remains that there is still only one privately leased airport (another one was long ago given back to the public sector) - and it isn't even in the mainland US; rather in a Commonwealth territory, where the citizens can't even vote for president.

There are no other potential leases of any consequence on the horizon, but that does not mean there is no interest.

In the late 2000s and early 2010s two attempts were made to lease Chicago Midway Airport, and then in 2019 the St Louis Lambert airport.

Two of the three failures were down to political pressures on the respective city mayor, but in all cases there were plenty of big name companies (both indigenous and from abroad) that tried to get in on the action. In the case of St Louis there were 18 of them.

The conclusion of a new paper from the think tank, The Reason Foundation (and CAPA - Centre for Aviation has always taken this line), is that the problem is the lack of interest from the sellers rather than the buyers, and that this is directly tied to the tax laws that require tax-exempt bonds - which constitute a major element of airport infrastructure funding, to be paid up by the airport owner if it is leased.

The upshot is that the second Trump administration might pick up where it left off the first time around and relax those laws, and The Reason Foundation is lobbying hard for that outcome.

This report includes original content from the Reason Foundation report and additional comment from CAPA - Centre for Aviation.

The Cathay Pacific Group is following through on its plans to boost its Mainland China network significantly during 2025, by adding new routes and preparing to expand frequencies on others.

Cathay announced that it will start flying between Hong Kong and Changsha on 4-Nov-2025, making it the fifth Mainland China destination added by the group this year. More capacity will be allocated to primary mainland routes in the upcoming winter season.

Last year Cathay Group executives identified growth in the mainland market as one of their priorities, with LCC subsidiary HK Express playing a major role in that strategy.

In Apr-2025 a senior Cathay executive again highlighted mainland network growth (as well as expansion in the US market).

Cathay's position as a hub airline on the doorstep of Mainland China has always been one of its fundamental advantages, and this advantage has reasserted itself after the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Cathay Group now serves the mainland market slightly differently from in 2019 - but that has not changed the fact that it is still a vital part of its network and business.

EasyJet has welcomed the UK government's 21-Sep-2025 approval of a second runway at Gatwick. London's number two airport is easyJet's biggest base, home to around 70 of its 359 aircraft.

The low cost airline's CEO, Kenton Jarvis, said that the UK government "recognises the importance of aviation as an enabler of economic growth". However, he also cautioned that expansion must be "affordable with the right infrastructure in place to ensure a good customer experience".

This news shines the spotlight on easyJet and its business model. This report looks at its strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats. Gatwick expansion is both an opportunity and a threat.

The latest iteration of OAG's Global Megahubs report points to the Asia Pacific region being the one still to watch in respect of connectivity. It dominates the two main 2025 tables (global all business models and LCC only) that are published and critiqued here; Kuala Lumpur's main airport remains the one with the greatest connectivity in the region, the #1 anywhere for low-cost travel, and joint fourth in the global table, the highest ranking one from its region.

Asia Pacific doesn't have it all its own way though.

London Heathrow continues to fly the flag for the old world order as #1 for connectivity globally, and if its third runway ever sees the light of day it may never lose that title. Heathrow's strength is not so much in the number of destinations on offer as the frequencies on those routes.

Istanbul scores highly on routes - the highest number anywhere.

Other European airports do not fare so well though, with airports such as Frankfurt and Amsterdam further down the table on account of a greater influence on them by flight restrictions - especially over Russia.

While only one of the Middle East 'Big 3' airports makes much impact in these tables, Dubai is more notable for its position in the LCC table (5th) than it is for the 'global all business' models table (13th)!

Meanwhile, two Latin American airports fly the flag for a region that is otherwise devoid of representation.

When PLAY took to the skies in 2021, it sought to fill the gap vacated by the bankruptcy of WOW air in Mar-2019: low cost flights from Iceland to Europe and to North America, connecting the two continents. By 2023 it had 19% of international seats to/from Iceland, mainly at the expense of Icelandair.

However, PLAY has ended the same way as WOW air. It ceased operations and filed for bankruptcy on 29-Sep-2025.

The reasons it gave for the decision included the company's weaker than expected performance, poor recent sales following negative media coverage and employee discontent over changes in strategy.

PLAY's strategic shift away from the North Atlantic hub-and-spoke model to focus on point-to-point leisure destinations in Europe, announced in autumn 2024, has not been able to "deliver results sufficient to overcome the company's deep-rooted challenges".

The main winner from PLAY's exit will be Icelandair.

The Brazilian airframer Embraer arguably had a record Sep-2025 making much-needed inroads into the US, with an order for Embraer 195-E2s from Avelo and a key win in its home market after LATAM committed to the aircraft.

The E-Jets will allow both airlines to enter new markets, and also possibly marks a shift in the historical thinking - thinking that in some cases smaller jets add too much complexity in fleet management.

It will be interesting to see if Embraer's momentum continues, and the deployment of the E-Jets by its new customers will be watched closely.